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j 1.0 Introduction
On 18 December 1978 two USAF F-106A aircraft were struck
within a few minutes of each other by separate lightning strikes
near Castle AFB, California. Both aircraft had been equipped
" with the lightning protection modiflcation kit in accordance i:
with USAF T.O. IF-106-I130 dated 1 February 1976. This
"_ . modification is described briefly in the Appendix. i
_ One of the aircraft was struck twice and the other one once i
i and the pilot reports indicated that the strikes may have been I
I:
very severe. The strikes caused extensive damage to the pitot
heater harnesses and AWG No. 8 ground wires in each radome, and
" to the lightning suppressors included with the protection modifi- '
: cation kit, although no damage occurred to either aircraft's elec-
trical or avionics systems which this kit is intended to protect.
Because of the apparent severity of these strikes, and the
fact that a similar protection modification was being designed
for the F-Ill radome mounted pitot heater circuit, an investiga-
tion was made of these incidents. This investigation consisted
of a detailed inspection of the two aircraft and discussions with
the pilots of each, conducted on 3 January 1979 at Castle AFB,
California. This report presents the results of this investiga-
tion and an analysis of the findings. The inspection and pilot
interviews were conducted by J.A. Plumer of Lightning Technologies,
Inc. and H.M. Bryant of the USAF Sacramento Air Logistics Command, }
McClellan AFB, California. !
2.0 Summary i
The two aircraft each sustained severe lightning strikes to the
pitot booms, resulting in extensive damage to the pitot heater power
h,_rness, No. 8 ground wire, and lightning suppressors, but there was
no damaqe to neither aircraft's electrical or avionic systems.
A simulated lightning current of 226 kA and 3.8 x i06 A_'s was
required to reproduce the damage sustained by the AWG No. 8 ground
wires in the radomes of these aircraft. This is nearly twice the
energy of,present aircraft lightning current test criteria (200 kA,
2 x I0 _ A''s). If the protection modification had not been in place
a surge of major intensity would have entered the aircrafts' elec-
tric power distribution systems and the resulting damage to onboard
avionics might have been extensive.
3.0 Aircraft Details
The aircraft were inspected and were identified as follows:
Aircraft A: F-106A
Aircraft B: F-106A
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#4.0 Investigation ofAircraft A
4.1 Pilot Report
' i
: .
This aircraft, which was the lead of a close-in formation !f
of two, sustained two lightning strikes several minutes apart.
The first strike occurred at about 4:30 - 4:45 PM while the flight 0
_ was descending through 1524 m (5000 ft) in the vicinity of some
small cumulus clouds and layers of cirrus clouds. It had just
: entered a heavy rain shower "hen the first strike occurred.
The pilot reported that the _trike produced a "big flash" and
felt "like someone hit the side of the aircraft with a sledgehammer".
After this strike the aircraft entered a radar pattern (in
preparation for landing) and a few minutes later a secona strike
occurred, producing a "ka-wham" and flash more severe than the
first strike. The "Tonotron" radar scope went black and then
came on again, with a "snowy" picture. The pilot reported no other
instrument malfunctions, flags, circuit breaker pops or blown fuses
aftel either strike. The aircraft proceeded to make an uneventful
landing.
4.2 Inspection Findings
4.2.1 External
There was evidence of lightning attachment to the very tip
of the pitot tube and swept attachment points appeared every 15 cm
((_ in.) o," so along the tube and polislh,d aluminum boom. The aft-most
lightning strike attachment points were on the adapter unit and
glycol ring at the nose of the radome. There was no singeing or
thermal discoloration of the radome aft of the adapter, nor were
there any attachment points on the fuselage aft of the radome.
This indicates a flash of relatively short duration (i.e. i0 milli-
seconds).
The degree of melting and localized nature of the attachment
points along the boom indicate a moderate amount of continuing
current and anode attachment points (i.e. negative electrons en-
tered the boom_.
The radome was not punctured.
i The flash apparently exited the right wing-tip as indicated
by an area '_ x 0._ x O.l_ cm (2 x 0.12_ x 0.25 in.) of aluminum .
eroded away from the trailing edge.
4.2.2 Internal
4.2.2.1 Pitot Tube and Boom Assembly
I. The heater power harness ground wire had been burned away
from the splice adjacent to the varistor as illustrated
in Figure I.
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Figure i - Pitot Heater Ground Wire Burned Away from
Splice in Boom of Aircraft A.
"Hot" wire was disconnected later).
2. The varistor (S/N: J/C 084) quality was checked in accord-
ance with USAF T.O. IF-106A-2-10-2-1S-I
case marking: 434 VDC @ i mA DC
+ side to grd: 371 " "
- side to grd: 328 " "
USAF T.0. IF-106A-2-10-2-1S-I permits a change in varistor
voltage of up to 20%. Thus, the (-) reading is beyond
tolerance and the varistor should be replaced with _ new
one.
3. The pitot tube heater tested 20 ohms line-to-line and ®
line-to-ground, indicating the the pitot tube remains in
good condition.
4. There was no other physical damage to the wiring or com-
ponents inside the boom.
• 4.2.2.2 Radome
I. The #8 AWG insulated ground wire (Part No. M5086/2-8-9)
had been blown away from its terminating lugs and
broken and fragmented at numerous places along its length
inside the radome. The remains can be seen in Figure 2.
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The outer (cloth) part of its insulation was "brcwned" and the
inner (plastic) layer had been melted (boiled), and resolidified
in many places. The tinning on the copper strands had been va-
porized and the wire made brittle. The largest rem,.ining section
of this ground wire is shown in Figure 3.
Figure 3 - Remnant of No. 8 AWG Ground Wire (P/N M5086/2-8-9)
in Radome of Aircraft A.
2. The inside of the radome at each end of the ground wire, _
and at several places in between was found discolored
with metallic deposits from the blown-up ground wire.
The forward side of the aluminum rim was bent inward
slightly near the ground lug,
3. Fragments from the ground wire were found tightly lodged
beneath the static tubes and clamps that run along the
top of the radome. Several of these can be seen in
Figure 2.
4. The studs at each end of the ground wire were intact and
reusable, but the ground-wire terminals there had been
" melted or broken in two.
5. Not all pieces of the heater power harness and teflon
insulating sleeve were available for inspection. Those
that were howev_£, (2 pieces over 46 cm long) showed indi-
cations of dielectric breakdown at their ends. A portion
of the teflon sleeve can be seen in Figure 3.
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6. There was evidence of arcing between the ground wire
and the ILS localizer antenna tube near the aft-most
clamp, and from the localizer tube to the aft ring
(across a 2.54 cm air gap). The locations of this arcing
are shown in Figure 4.
Evidence of arcing _ J'%_.-_'-
Ground Wire \_ ,/,/
Figure 4 - Locations of Electrical Arcing between the
Ground Wire and the Localizer Antenna on Aircraft A.
7. There was evidence of arcing between the heater power
harness and the aft ring about 46 cm out from the
P/N 3S2060DMI85AI suppressor.
8. The suppressor case had been fractured and blown away
around the rectangular LI and L2 inductors, which had
been deformed and rounded by magnetic forces due to
excessive current in these inductors. The damaged
suppressor can be seen in Figure 5.
6
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Figure 5 - Damaged P/N 3S2060DMI85AI Lightning Suppressor aftez
Lightning Strikes to Aircraft _.
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9. There was evidence of electrical arcing between one turn
(each) of LI and L2 and the suppressor mounting frame
several turns out from the ground (aircraft) ends of these
inductors. This can be seen in Figure 6.
7 A
Figure 6 - Evidence of Minor Electrical Arcing between LI and
L2 Windings and the Metal Frame after Potting Mate-
rial Broke Away (Aircraft A.
r
i0. Results of the suppressor varistor quality check in accord-
ance with USAF T.O. ]F-IO6A-21-10-2-15-1 were as follows:
case marking: unavailable for inspection
+ side to ground: +419VDC @ I mA DC
- side to ground -351 " "
II. The pitot heater harness aft of the suppressor was undamaged
as shown in Figure 5. There was no evidence of electrical
arcing at the bulkhead connector.
12. The L2 windin_ in the suppressor had been burned in two
where it arced to the mounting plate. P_wer circuit con-
tinuity through the suppressor was maintained through the
high side (LI) of the suppressor.
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13. The non-metallic pitot and static lines (that run
along the top of the radome) were undamaged.
14. The radar reflector dish had been cracked due to
, blast forces associated with the electrical arcing
that was unleashed inside the radome when the ground
wire failed.
_ 4.3 Analysis
i. The evidence reported in the previous paragraph supports
the following hypothesis:
The first strike probably left the lightning protection
system intact. This conclusion is made because there appar-
ently remained a conductive path for the second strike to
follow inside the radome, since the radome was not blown up
upon the second strike. Also, the pilot reported that the
first strike was not as loud as the second one.
2. The second strike caused the #8 AWG ground wire termi-
nations to fall at each end. This failure was caused by
excessive magnetic forces that acted to break the wire at
these points, and by thermal stresses that melted and weak-
ened the crimped-on terminals at each end. This strike also
caused the ground wire to become very hot; sufficient to melt
and discolor the insulation along its entire length.
3. The ground wire terminations failed before all of the
lightning current had passed. The balance of the current
thus sparked into both conductors of the heater power har-
ness; following, alternately, the harness and broken seg-
ments of the No. 8 ground wire to the aft ring. The high
temperatures associated with each of these arcs caused the
harness and/or ground wire to melt in two at these places.
This caused the fragmentation observed in Figure 2.
4. After the aft ground-wlre termination failed, the re-
maining lightning current arced over to the ILS antenna tube
and from there to the rim, as was illustrated in Figure 4
and evidenced by melted spots at these places.
5. Also after the ground wire failed, some of the light-
ning current started to enter the heater harness, following
this path into the suppressor. This current, of course, far
• exceeded the design level of the suppressor, and as it passed
through LI and L2, the magnetic forces it produced caused
rounding and deformation of these coils. This in turn burst
the potting compound and exposed the coils. Several of the
turns touched the suppressor mounting bracket causing the
0
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sparks and melting at the corner of one or two turns of
each coil. The "hot" wire (LI) was melted in two and the
hot wire (Pin A) of plug P1 was also melted, indicating
that most of the lightning current in the harness had
chanced to enter this wire. Some of this melting may also
have been caused by 400 hertz AC power current arcing to
ground through this fault, although the absence of a blown
fuse indicates that this was unlikely.
,_ The current that had entered the inductors was limited by
them to an amount that could be tolerated by the varistor,
which shunted it to ground. The varistor and the series
inductor (L3) protected the aircraft's electrical system
from any remaining surges.
5.0 Investigation of Aircraft B
5.1 Pilot Report
This aircraft, which was by itself, approximately 74 km (40 miles)
away from aircraft A, sustained one lightning strike while flying at
1.7 km (5700 ft) and 275 knots about 28 km (15 miles) west of the
field.
The pilot reported that the flight had been flying among
layers of stratus clouds, and had just entered an area of very
heavy rain when the strike occurred. It produced a "big white
flash" that blinded him for about 5 seconds, even though his eyes
had been focused on instruments when the strike occurred. The
strike also produced a "loud bang", even though the pilot had
earphones on at the time, and a "tingling" about the helmet.
The radar scope went black when the stzlke occurred, but no
other effects to avionics or electrical apparatus were noted by
the pilot.
The airframe radar had been painting "mostly ground clutter"
prior to the strike and the pilot was not aware that he was ap-
proaching thunderstorm-type weather. No such storms had been
forecast in the area, although the nearby town of Merced experi-
enced a hall storm that same day.
After the strike occurred the aircraft proceeded to land un-
eventfully.
5.2 Inspection Findings
The lightning strike effects on this aircraft were very simi-
lar to those reported in Para. 4.2 for aircraft A as follows:
l0
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J5.2.1 Extern_!
I. There was evidence of lightning attachment to the side
of the pitot tube, as indicated by the dendritic pat- ,
terns left on the stainless steel tube pictured in
*: Figure 7.
• }
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Figure 7 - Dendritic Patterns Left by Lightning Strike Attachment
to Pitot Probe of Aircraft B.
2. There was minor damage to the fiberglass cap of the ver-
tical stabilizer, which was the other lightning attach-
ment point.
3. The radome was dela_fnated for about 6 inches along the
bottom.
5.2.2 Internal
I. The No. 8 ground vlre and pltot heater power harness had
• been broken and fragmtnted between the pitot boom and
aft ring. The longest segment of ground vlre remaining was
e cm (3 in.) £n length• The inside surface of the radome
was covered with deposits of copper near the forward and
aft ends, as thown in Figure 8. The largest piece of
hea_er power harness remaining Is shown i'_ Figure 9.
11
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Figure 8 - Inside of Radome of Aircraft B Following Lightning Strike,
Showing Copper Deposit on Inside Wall at Forward End.
I ILlII ...... '
4
t
Figure 9 - Remains of Pitot Heater Power Harness after Lightning
Strike to Aircraft B.
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o There was physical evidence of electrical arcing between
the ground wire and the ILS antenna conduit as had oc-
curred in aircraft A.
_, 3. The P/N 3S2060DMI85AI lightning suppressor case had
ruptured in a manner very similar to the one in the
other aircraft, as shown in Figure i0.
.. , ,
Figure I0 - P/N 3S2060DMI85AI Lightning Suppressor after
Lightning Strike to Aircraft B.
The suppressor varistor quality was checked in accordance
with USAF T.O. IF-106A-2-10-2-1S-l, with results as follows:
case marking: not available for inspection
+ side to ground: 408 VDC @ I mA DC
- side to ground: 400 VDC @ i mA DC
While the original varistor voltage was not available (the portion
of the suppressor case with the stamped label having been frag-
mented and lost), the voltages of most of the varistors utilized
in these suppressors range between 410 and 440 volts. In accord-
ance with USAF T.O. IF-106A-2-10-2-1S-I the varistor voltage must
remain within 20% of its original level. The varistor in this
suppressor, then, appears to be undamaged. The suppressor, of
course, must be discarded due to the ruptured case and damaged LI
and L2 windings.
13
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* 4. There was no damage to the heater power harness between
the suppressor and the aircraft.
i 5. There was no damage to any of the components within the i
_ pitot boom. The varistor P/N 164B7290GI was given a !
quality check with the following results:
-_. case marking: 423 VDC @ i mA DC :
_-_ + side to ground: 410 VDC @ I mA DC i!
_" - Side to ground: 419 VDC @ I mA DC i
This indicates that the varistor was not overstressed.
5.3 Analysis |:
The similarity of damage between this aircraft and
aircraft A indicates that the same sequence of events occurred
(see Para. 4.3). The intensity of the current, measured in terms
of action-integral _A2"s), exceeded the capability of the No. 8
ground wire and the wire failed, forcing some of the current to
enter the heater power harness. This damaged the harness conduc- I_
tors, and as it flowed in the suppressor inductors LI and L2, it I
caused these coils to round themselves and rupture the case and !
potting compound. The suppressor, however, succeeded in keeping ._
damaging current and voltage surges out of the aircrafts' power •
, distribution system.
6.0 Concluding Discussion
6.1 Regarding the Lightnin_ Strikes I_
I'
There are several aspects of these strikes that are worthy of
note:
I. Of the three strikes that occurred, two were similar
and of an intensity far exceeding the level of pres-
ently accepted lightning protection design and test
criteria.* An attempt to duplicate the damage to the
No. 8 ground wire and the melting of its surrounding
insulation required a current whose action integral
was 3.8x106 A2"s.
Because the modification kit was designed for retro-
fit installation, it was not designed or qualified
to the 2x106 A2"s level. Instead, it was qualifi-
" cation tested to 0.46x106 A2"s in accordance with
San Antonio Air Logistics Command/MME Purchase Des-
cription No. 320.
*SAE C0mmfttee AE_L Report, _'Lightning _eft Waveforms an_ Techni-
ques for Aerospace Vehicles and Hardware", dated June, 1978,
Para. 3.2.2.1 (current component A).
14
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I'
_: 2. The occurrence of strokes as high as 2x106 A2"s is a I
rarity in itself (approximately 1% of known lightning
currents exceed this level) so the occurrence of two
•- of them within a few minutes of each other must be i_
i_ considered a very rare occurrence.
_ 3 The absence of extensive swept-stroke attachment points
on either aircraft indicates that the total time dura-
"_ tion of each strike was comparatively short, perhaps a
,_ few milliseconds. For example, if it is assumed that "!,
the strike first attached to the tip of the pitot probe
and re-attached successively at points along the I 83 m
(6 ft) long boom (as confirmed by the physical evidence)
and also that the aircraft was traveling at 1830 m/sec
(600 ft/sec), the duration, Td, of the flash would be:
6 ft
= = 0.01 sec.
Td 600 ft/sec
This, together with the extent of the damage inflicted 'I_
upon the ground wires, indicates that the strikes may
" have been of the positive polarity variety in which i
most of the energy is transferred in a single stroke. ;
6.2 Regarding the Lightning Protection Kit i
i
i. The lightning currents in these strikes exceeded the t
capability of the No. 8 ground wires in the radomes. I
Failure of the ground wires applied excessive stress !
' to the suppressor, causing the effects noted. If the I
ground wires had not failed the suppressors would not
have ruptured.
2. The possibility of future ground wire failures under
unusually severe strokes like this could be minimized
by replacement of the No. 8 wire with a longer No. 6
wire. The fact that the system failed safe in these
cases, and that severe strokes like this are very rare
would indicate that a safety of flight hazard is a
remote probability and a fleet-wide modification in
the ground wire is not warranted, however.
J
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LAppendix :
/ F-106A Lightning Strike Protection Modification
: The F-106A lightning protection modification is described
_° in USAF T.O. IF-I06-I130 dated I February 1976 and incorporates ,
_ modification kit identification No. 1560K0150172ABK.
.r
; Briefly modification replaces the original AWG No. 12
pitot boom ground wire with a No. 8 wire capable of sustaining
more severe lightning currents, and places a lightning suppressor,
Part. No. 3S2060DMI85AI in series with the pitot heater power
harness to prevent damaging surges from entering the aircraft's
power distribution system. A varistor is also placed across the
heater power harness at the pitot tube to minimize the possibility
of heater burn-out due to a lightning-induced voltage surge in the
harness.
The lightning suppressor incorporates a pair of series in-
ductors, LI and L2, to limit the amount of lightning current that
can flow in the heater power harness to safe levels and force
most of it to remain in the ground wire. A varistor and single
inductor, L3, prevent damaging voltage surges from passing on into
the aircraft. The suppressor circuit is shown on Figure Ii.
To To Pitot
Boom Heater
P/N 3S2060DMI85AI
I I
I I
I
! _I _L2 !I
I ) _:) I
I I
I I
I I
' '
' _i_ l: *I A To
,, T _,/'U: n ACI GE-MOV ! d PwrI Varistor I
I - I
elm m _m I_ iD im _ _ _ IBm m m im em m J
Figure ii - Basic Electric Circuit of P/N 3S2060DMI85AI Suppressor.
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